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Through a comparative analysis of Germany and Russia, this paper explores how
participation in thememorialization process affects and reflects national identity formation
in post-totalitarian societies. These post-totalitarian societies face the common problem of
re-presenting their national character as civic and democratic, in great part because their
national identities were closely bound to oppressive regimes. Through a comparison of
three memorial sites—Sachsenhausen concentration camp memorial in Germany, and
Lubianka Square and the Park of Arts in Russia—we argue that even where dramatic
reductions in state power and the opening of civil society have occurred, a simple
elite–public dichotomy cannot adequately capture thenature of participation in theprocess
of memory re-formation. Rather, mutual interactions among multiple publics and elites,
differing in kind and intensity across contexts, combine to form a complex pastiche of
public memory that both interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable models for its
future. The domination of a ‘Western’ style of memorialization in former East Germany
illustrates how even relatively open debates can lead to the exclusion of certain represen-
tationsof thenation. Nonetheless, Germany hashad comparatively vigorouspublic debates
about memorializing its totalitarian periods. In contrast, Russian elite groupshave typically
circumvented or manipulated participation in the memorialization process, reflecting both
a reluctance to deal with Russia’s totalitarian past and a emerging national identity less
civic and democratic than in Germany.
Key words: Germany, monuments and memorials, politics of memory, public memory,
Russia.
Introduction
As much recent scholarship suggests, ‘public
memory’ develops and solidifies through social
and cultural processes rather than individual
psychology. Societies create ‘histories’ for
themselves through material representations of
the past in arenas that, in turn, function as
symbols of a ‘people’ or nation (Halbwachs
1992 [1951]; Nora 1996; Till 2003). Nora, for
example, describes how self-consciously con-
structed commemorative places and events of
memory (lieux de me´moire) in modern France,
including archives, parades, books and monu-
ments, result from confrontational relation-
ships between official and vernacular
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memories. In that case, alternative, unsanc-
tioned forms of public memory oppose and
contest the dominant ‘official memories’ pre-
sented by political elites. We argue that this
dichotomy between official (or elite) and ver-
nacular (or public) forms of memory is overly
simplistic. Mutual interactions among multiple
publics and elites, differing in kind and inten-
sity across contexts, combine to form a com-
plex pastiche of public memory that both
interprets a nation’s past and suggests desirable
models for its future. Through an analysis of
two post-totalitarian societies, Germany and
Russia, we argue that even where a dramatic
reduction in state power and the opening of
civil society has occurred, an elite–public di-
chotomy does not adequately describe the na-
ture of participation in the process of memory
re-formation.
Places of memory typically represent the past
through historical exhibitions, sculptures or as
focal points for commemorative events. They
may be symbolic spaces where officials and
other social groups express their contemporary
political agendas to a larger ‘public’. The social
and spatial nature of public memory affects
both symbolic representations and dominant
conceptualizations of the nation. We define
public memory as the cultural spaces and pro-
cesses through which a society understands,
interprets and negotiates myths about its past;
through those processes, dominant cultural un-
derstandings of a ‘nation’ or ‘people’ may be
formed (Till 1999: 255). Yet there may not be
consensus amongst state and local elite groups
as to how and if these places should be remade,
because ‘official’ agendas vary. Further, differ-
ent social groups, functioning as distinct ‘pub-
lics’ and counter-publics, may interact with
officials or choose other actions that influence
the remaking of these places. As we demon-
strate below, public memory is an activity or
process rather than an object or outcome.1
The process of public memory is especially
evident during the political changes that ac-
company post-totalitarian transitions. A suc-
cessful transition from totalitarianism to
democracy arguably requires a public dis-
cussion about how a society remembers its
recent past, including how the previous regime
repressed civil society through fear, silence and
violence. Should such acts be defined as
‘crimes’? If so, who is held responsible: individ-
uals, representatives of the state and/or society
in general? Such questions are particularly
troublesome in societies in transition, especially
in those cases where human rights abuses were
denied and (may still be) concealed by state
officials (Kramer 2001; McAdams 2001). Dis-
cussions about ‘crimes’ and responsibility are
central to the politics of public memory, be-
cause national histories are (re)narrated
through such debates.
For societies undergoing political transition,
place-making and memory processes are
significant spatial practices through which the
national past is reconstructed and through
which political and social change may be nego-
tiated. There may be practical reasons for state
officials or groups to publicly acknowledge (or
forget) victims of the previous regime and com-
municate post-totalitarian principles: commem-
oration involves relatively little material
investment and does not require most people to
change institutional and everyday practices.
Yet the memorialization process is far from
straightforward. The reasons why a place may
be established and (re)situated through com-
memorations or historical narratives may vary,
as will the ways such places of memory will be
interpreted and used.
The national and international contexts of
public memory in any given society also have
profound influences on the negotiation and
definition of places of memory. In this respect,
Germany and Russia offer striking contrasts. In
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comparison to Russia, Germany has had a
long-standing history of addressing and com-
memorating the crimes and victims of National
Socialism through various venues (war tri-
bunals, de-Nazification policies, political edu-
cation programmes, museums at historic
locations, memorials and so on). These at-
tempts were uneven in the divided Germanies
following the Second World War and have
remained so since unification, resulting from
both international coercion and in response to
local and national popular protests (Fulbrook
1999; Herf 1997). Although problems, contra-
dictions and silences remain in the post-
unification process of public memory (Dodds
and Allen-Tompson 1994; Smith 2000), Ger-
many has had relatively open and vigorous
public debates about its totalitarian periods,
including the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) past. In contrast, the most powerful
Russian elite groups have typically circum-
vented or manipulated public participation in
the memorialization process since 1991,
reflecting both a reluctance to deal with Rus-
sia’s totalitarian past and an emerging national
identity less civic and democratic than in Ger-
many.
In this article, we first review the connection
between place and public memory, arguing that
the specific nature of this relationship is es-
pecially important in understanding national
identity formation in post-totalitarian regimes.
The article then examines three case studies
from Germany and Russia. We first consider
debates over the renovation of the Sachsen-
hausen concentration camp memorial in the
former GDR. In Russia, we examine place-
based memory and forgetting at Lubianka
Square (headquarters of the Soviet and now
Russian secret police) and the Park of Arts
(where several significant Soviet-era statues
found new homes after their removal from
places of honour in Moscow). We conclude
with a discussion of how the nature of partici-
pation in public memory is fundamental to the
re-presentation of national identity and mem-
ory in post-totalitarian societies.
Place, public memory and post-totalitarian
societies
What is required for a society to confront a
shameful past? Should a new regime memorial-
ize past acts of state-perpetrated violence and
injustice as part of its heritage, and if so how?
How should the past—the memory of the vic-
tims, the acknowledgement of ‘crimes’, and the
confrontation of social responsibility—be rep-
resented and remembered? While Germans
have long rigorously debated and negotiated
such questions as a consequence of the legacies
of National Socialism, other states in transition
have also begun to explore these difficult ques-
tions in recent years.
Central to these public debates have been the
processes of defining ‘criminal’ acts (in state
and/or international law) and assigning re-
sponsibility for such acts. What is the nature of
past acts and under what jurisdiction (cultural,
state, international, humanity) should these
past acts be tried (if at all)? Questions also
emerge about individual and societal complic-
ity, denial and resistance, which become es-
pecially complicated when state officials
continue to hold positions of power after the
political transition. Citizen demands for com-
pensation, accountability and mourning for
prior acts of state-perpetrated violence may
also be difficult to adjudicate. In short, the
larger social task of working through the his-
tories and lingering spectres of these pasts in
contemporary society is far from straightfor-
ward (Barkan 2000; Buruma 1994; Nevins
2003).
Post-totalitarian societies provide especially
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good cases for studying the negotiation and
reformation of public memory precisely be-
cause they must face such questions about past
regimes. Totalitarian regimes differ from auth-
oritarian regimes in that they demand mass
popular mobilization in support of the state,
mobilization that ranges from coerced, to indif-
ferently feigned, to genuinely enthusiastic. Even
though the extent of actual mobilization may
be limited, totalitarian regimes base their legiti-
macy on symbolic mobilization; even Fascist
dictators claimed to rule ‘in the name of the
people’ (Agnew 1998). Thus, as Cohen (1985:
126) observes in regard to the Soviet case,
‘historical justice is a powerful “ethical-moral”
idea that knows no statute of limitations, es-
pecially when reinforced by the sense that the
whole nation bore some responsibility for what
happened’. Nonetheless, widespread public
participation and reckoning with the past did
not simply replace top-down state control in
either Germany or Russia. Indeed, as we dem-
onstrate, the transitions had complex and am-
biguous consequences for public memory in
both societies.
If post-totalitarian societies choose to ad-
dress previous crimes, the process of public
memory must reconcile collective and individ-
ual participation and complicity in ways that
provide both penitence and catharsis.2 In such
societies, the recognition and acceptance of the
past requires public participation for the very
reason that the previous regime excluded the
‘public’—in the active, democratic and deliber-
ative sense—from state representations of the
nation. As a result, dealing with the past after
the fall of the regime also demands public
participation and attracts interest from citizens
in uniquely profound ways. Without genuine
involvement by a range of social groups and
citizens, representations of the past are simply
a new form of state spectacle or propaganda
that reinforces centralized authority and ex-
cludes democratic participation (cf. Ley and
Olds 1988; Thomas 2002). While the politics of
place-making and memory in public settings
(even in democratic states) is always marked by
the spectres of past memorialization practices
that served to legitimate state power,3 in post-
totalitarian societies commemorative genres
and representational forms—the monumental
memorial on a pedestal, the museum-temple
housing national collections and victories,
officials ceremoniously laying wreaths on na-
tional memorial days—may be interpreted by
citizens and others as providing continuity,
rather than a break, with state power and
social relations. Indeed, continuity may some-
times be a goal of such practices.
In contrast, widespread participation in mak-
ing and remaking ‘public’ places of memory
can be both a means and an end of post-totali-
tarian transitions where the past is confronted
and a new civic-democratic society is created.
Critical discussion about the multiple meanings
of the forms, functions and locations of public
places of memory, as well as the pasts to be
remembered, may be a process through which
past injustices can be confronted to work
through cultural trauma (LaCapra 1994), and
to imagine different futures.
Yet transitions may also result in a crisis of
memory and representation, and a questioning
of normative ‘regimes of place’ (McDowell
1999). Societies cannot simply abandon past
cultures of memory or meanings of place.
Rather, continuities from past to present and
familiar narratives of self and belonging fre-
quently appear in the discussions on the consti-
tution of memory in the media, through legal
institutions, and local political and cultural
practices. We argue that the political and social
uncertainties that characterize transitions may
in fact encourage a process of bricolage,
whereby citizens and social groups use ‘a pas-
tiche of materials at hand to create a coherent
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narrative of tradition, memory, and history’
(Forest and Johnson 2002: 542). In such cases,
it may be especially difficult for a society to
confront its recent past, particularly because
the recent past remains part of the present,
creating unexpected and unknown social insta-
bilities, and making it more difficult for people
to imagine possibilities for different futures.
Scholars have identified the ‘invention of
tradition’ as a means to provide stability in a
seemingly chaotic present (Hobsbawm and
Ranger 1992). Yet they have not been as sensi-
tive to the complex interactions of the range of
participants in the process of public memory.
Social scientists influenced by Nora (1989) tend
to focus on elite roles in public memory forma-
tion and reformation, and when they do in-
clude citizen participation, they tend to assume
implicitly a dichotomy between elite/official
memory, on the one hand, and popular/ver-
nacular memory, on the other. For example, in
her discussion of concentration camps in Ger-
man memory, Koonz (1994: 261) distinguishes
between official memory (expressed in cere-
monies and leaders’ speeches) and popular
memory (reflected in the media, newspapers,
oral histories, memoirs and opinion polls), and
argues that ‘public memory is the battlefield on
which these two compete for hegemony’.
While we agree that there are differences in
the outcomes of public memory, the emphasis
on this official/popular dichotomy results in an
incomplete understanding of the process of
memory. Certainly there are methodological
reasons for emphasizing official memory, in-
cluding the limited nature of archival materials
and documents, and the investment of time
needed to research contemporary transitions.
Nonetheless, the epistemological assumptions
underlying the official/popular memory di-
chotomy also inform how scholars read such
documents and practices, and interpret power
relations. Koonz, for example, while providing
a rich range of representational materials in her
analysis, problematically assumes that ceremo-
nial speeches reflect the intentions of those in
power, and that newspaper articles represent
the populace. Such an approach implies that
elites constitute a coherent group or that they
can impose their ideological understandings on
to seemingly passive subjects through grandiose
public displays and monumental spaces. While
this may be true in certain ways and for certain
forms of control, power cannot be conceived
merely as a directional flow of ruler to ruled, or
described simply as repression and domination
(Foucault 1977a). Particularly in democratic or
quasi-democratic settings, elites may need to
negotiate with diverse centres of power, or may
need to respond to popular understandings and
interpretations. Even in totalitarian and auth-
oritarian regimes, individuals may choose to
resist elite interpretations of monumental land-
scapes through everyday practices, such as tell-
ing jokes (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998;
Hershkovitz 1993; Scott 1985).
At the same time, recent work maintains the
distinction between official and popular mem-
ory by assuming a crisis model of modern
society, nostalgic understandings of the pre-
modern and/or romantic depictions of political
struggle (Johnson 1999; Legg 2004; Sturken
1997; Till 2003). Nora, for example, describes
the disappearance of ‘true’ memory—embodied
in cultural practices situated in milieux, or
contexts, of memory—with the rise of his-
tory—self-reflexive acts of archiving and cere-
moniously re-enacting the past—through the
emergence of modern lieux, or sites, of memory
(Nora 1989, 1996). As Legg (2004) argues,
Nora’s nostalgia for a time when memory was
‘real’ prevents him from critically engaging
with the contesting and heterogeneous
claimants to the idea of the French nation.
Nora’s project, continues Legg, mourns for the
French nation, or at least the ideal of a time
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with coherent state power as opposed to a
pluralistic nationhood. Further, Johnson (1999)
argues that Nora’s temporal framework treats
space as epiphenomenal to the process of his-
tory.
Scholars who take seriously the ‘voices from
below’ and what Foucault (1980) called ‘subju-
gated knowledges’ into the analysis of memory
practices tend to focus on acts of resistance and
the creation of ‘alternative’ places of memory
in ways that also maintain the official and
popular memory distinction (Bal, Crewe and
Spitzer 1999; Davis and Starn 1989; Gillis
1994a). Gillis (1994b) delineates a historical
progression from pre-national to national to
post-national phases of commemoration, where
in the final phase, social groups challenging
elite and official depictions of national history
have severed the ideological coherence between
the nation and the state. Within this postmod-
ern phase of commemoration, scholars often
theorize alternative sites of memory as venues
of resistance that challenge exclusive and total-
izing national narratives, such as Young’s
(1993) counter-sites of memory by German
artists. Such alternative places are theorized,
following Foucault (1977b), as popular sites of
‘countermemory’ defined in terms of their chal-
lenge to official and elite commemorative prac-
tices.
This analytical emphasis on resistance and
opposition simplifies the agendas of various
individuals and groups who may, at times,
work together to create alternative or subaltern
venues of memory (Frazier 1999). Following
Pile (1997) we argue that the underlying as-
sumptions about the domination–resistance
coupling are questionable (cf. Abu-Lughod
1990; Sharp, Routledge, Philo and Paddison
2000). Social groups historically have interacted
with officials to establish state venues of mem-
ory; officials and elites may also play significant
roles in the constitution of alternative places.
Further, as Sturken (1997) demonstrates, not all
places that result from this entangled process of
memory are necessarily political, and warns of
the implicit romanticization of Foucault’s con-
ception of popular memory.
Ultimately, the elite–public dichotomy is lim-
iting because neither category is conceptually
or politically coherent. Local, national and
even international officials, politicians and
other elites may have very different ideas of
what places of memory mean, what forms they
should take, what pasts should be remembered
(and in whose name) and what symbolic mean-
ings these places should communicate to a
larger audience (other officials, locals, nationals
or tourists). They may have different agendas
for these places, and may compete with each
other for control over monument sites, leading
to ideological conflict or incoherence (Agnew
1998; Forest and Johnson 2002).
Likewise, there is seldom a coherent ‘public’
or populace. Rather, there are many publics,
sub-publics and counter-publics, each possess-
ing distinct political agendas, access to re-
sources and authority, and understandings of
place (Fraser 1990). Their conceptualizations,
uses, experiences and understandings of specific
places of memory may differ sharply depending
upon their social positions and needs in the
present and projected future. As the case stud-
ies below demonstrate, at certain moments
some publics enjoy greater support, resources
and access to authority than others, and thus
may actively change landscapes; at other times
these publics are excluded (by state officials,
the media or other actors) in various realms
(Staeheli 1997). Further, while some publics
may engage in passionate conflicts with local
and national authorities over the politics of
memory, in other circumstances many people
are simply indifferent to these monumental
conflicts.
In short, public memory is a political process
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that both creates and responds to power rela-
tions and identities. At the national scale, elites,
publics and public spheres are dynamic, mul-
tiple, and intersecting social and spatial cate-
gories that cut across and through local, urban,
regional and international affiliations and
power relations. Consequently, studies of pub-
lic memory require nuanced understandings of
the complex relationships among these unstable
categories and social groupings that are con-
tinuously created and recreated through place-
making, social memory, and their related
multi-scaled and shifting configurations of
identity and belonging.
Place and public memory in Germany
Unlike other countries undergoing the tran-
sition from East Bloc satellite state to Western
democracy, in Germany the history of the GDR
is linked to the history of Germany’s other
totalitarian state, the Third Reich. Indeed, the
very existence of the GDR was a direct legacy
of National Socialism; after the end of the
Second World War, Germany and Berlin were
partitioned and occupied, and later divided into
two states that came to symbolize a larger Cold
War conflict. Not only did the National Social-
ist past continue to haunt the new Germany, so
too did the ways that the past was remembered
and forgotten in the Cold War period (Herf
1997). These hauntings were materialized in the
‘New Berlin’ and Germany through the estab-
lishment of new places of memory and the
remaking of GDR commemorative sites, in-
cluding sites of National Socialist violence
(Habermas 1997; Huyssen 1997; Till forth-
coming).
Contemporary German discussions about the
GDR totalitarian past were unique in another
way: they were tied to Western narratives
about ‘winning’ the Cold War, of ‘good’ tri-
umphing over ‘evil’. No other state so directly
addressed Cold War narratives of victory while
simultaneously working through a totalitarian
past. Following unification, the workings of the
GDR regime were interrogated through legal
trials of leaders and border police, and federal
investigative commissions, a process based in
part on Germany’s experience dealing with the
National Socialist past (Deutscher Bundestag
1994). This process included scholarly research
and discussions over which public places of
memory in the former East should be closed,
reformed or left open. Nonetheless, a relatively
black-and-white representation of the GDR
regime emerged to replace more nuanced un-
derstandings of East German society that had
been prevalent for the previous twenty years
(Fulbrook 1997). ‘The new historical picture
which was presented was one of heroes, vil-
lains, and victims: of an evil gang of criminals
at the top oppressing an innocent people be-
low, challenged only by a few resourceful
heroes of the opposition’ (Fulbrook 1999: 226).
The post-unification narrative of East Ger-
man society drew from the familiar trope of
‘Germans as victims’, one dating back to the
1930s, if not earlier, that projects responsibility
for past actions on to an ill-defined evil other
(Assmann and Frevert 1999; Marcuse 2001). In
this new myth, ‘ordinary’ East Germans were
represented as ‘victims’ of repressive regimes
and not held personally responsible for their
actions (and inactions) supporting the status
quo. Dominant cultural narratives also repre-
sented the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
as the ‘natural’ and inevitable model for a
unified German democratic state. Although the
German constitutional mandate required it,
there was no renegotiation of the Federal Re-
public’s Basic Law (similar to a constitution) at
the moment of German reunification. Based in
part on this omission, Habermas (1997) argues
that post-1990 social memory did not reflect a
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self-critical re-evaluation of the West German
state and political system.
Western mainstream magazines such as Der
Spiegel, newspapers like the Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung and commentaries by former
Chancellor Kohl sent the message that East
Germans needed to work through their pasts in
order to become part of (West) German civil
society. A problematic understanding that the
‘West’ had overcome its National Socialist past
and established a ‘normal’ democracy was im-
plicit in this narrative. The numerous radical
right activities that included xenophobic acts,
brutal attacks and even murder in places like
Rostock and Solingen were represented as an
East German youth problem. Yet evidence indi-
cated a more complicated social situation, such
as the activism and support of the radical right
in Western states (including activities by so-
called ‘necktie neo-Nazis’) and by West Ger-
man voters who supported far right or
established conservative parties running on
anti-foreigner campaigns. Rather than examine
this violence within the shifting social contexts
of unification, West German experts and crimi-
nologists characterized former GDR citizens as
morally flawed (Ho¨rschelmann 2001).
Places of memory, their historical narratives
and their social functions offer venues to ex-
plore how (and if) post-unification German
identities changed. Some scholars have exam-
ined the material erasure and reinterpretation
of GDR landscapes of memory in Berlin where
numerous monuments were quickly torn down,
Marxist–Leninist institutions were closed and
street names previously dedicated to commu-
nist fighters changed back to their pre-1933
names (Azaryahu 1997; De Soto 1996; Till
1996). Activist Western-based groups, such as
the Active Museum of Resistance against Fas-
cism in Berlin, argued that getting rid of the
GDR past in the material landscape recalled
the ‘forgetting’ of the National Socialist past
after the war, and would only make coming to
terms with the GDR past more difficult for
future generations (Aktives Museum 1990),
(Till, personal interviews with Christiana Hoss
and Martin Becher, Active Museum academic
staff, Berlin, 1997). Yet memorials created by
the East German state located at sites of Na-
tional Socialist violence could not simply be
shut down. Instead, these places of memory
were renovated and their histories revised to
reflect Western standards of pedagogy and his-
torical research.
The Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp
Memorial Museum in Oranienburg, Branden-
burg (near Berlin) in the former GDR was one
such place where post-totalitarian social identi-
ties were both constituted and challenged (Fig-
ure 1). A range of actors have articulated and
debated questions of social responsibility for
the dark national past through the functions,
forms and public meanings of this memorial.
Certain aspects of this process have been troub-
ling: the continued hegemony of conservative
cultural narratives, such as Germans as ‘vic-
tims’; the dominance of Western expert opin-
ion; and the simultaneous lack of critical
reflection about Western practices of memory.
Nonetheless, we interpret the discussions about
Sachsenhausen as a positive result of a long-
standing, albeit conflict-ridden, post-war West
German politics of memory.
Sachsenhausen was originally built as a
‘model’ concentration camp in 1936 and in-
cluded a SS-training camp and related labour
camps; during the GDR period some of these
buildings were reused by the People’s Army
and later the GDR police.4 Before this time,
from 1945 to 1950, Soviet occupiers used Sach-
senhausen (like Buchenwald) as a ‘Special
Camp’ to intern Nazi functionaries as well as
perceived enemies of the Soviet and emerging
GDR states. For ideological reasons, that his-
tory of the camp was not officially documented
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Figure 1 The main gate of Sachsenhausen’s prisoner concentration camp, Oranienburg, August
1997. Photograph by K. Till.
in the GDR. In 1961, in response to National
Socialist camp survivors’ demands, a memorial
complex was built, and Sachsenhausen, to-
gether with Buchenwald (1958) and Ravens-
bruck (1959) concentration camp memorials,
was transformed into one of the central com-
memorative ritual sites of the GDR. A monu-
ment, museums and ceremonial events
commemorated international anti-fascist resist-
ance fighters to support the myth of the East
German state (Morsch 1996, 2001; Wiedmer
1999; Young 1993).
After unification, the new, Western directors
of Sachsenhausen faced the difficult task of
transforming this central symbol of East Ger-
man anti-fascist identity into a part of larger
national and international networks of histori-
cal memory. They used recommendations from
a committee of historians and memorial mu-
seum experts commissioned by the state of
Brandenburg to evaluate these GDR concen-
tration camps (Endlich 1992). According to the
expert commission’s findings, the racist under-
pinnings of National Socialist persecution
were ignored because the historical exhibitions
at Sachsenhausen created during the GDR em-
phasized the central role of communist prison-
ers (including GDR leaders) in anti-fascist
resistance. Camp histories emphasized the in-
ternational origins of camp prisoners (from 19
different countries) and their heroic struggle
against Fascism, rather than describe the rea-
sons why Jews, Sinti and Roma, and other
social groups, such as homosexuals, were se-
lected for genocide or persecution (Deutscher
Bundestag 1994; Endlich 1992; Morsch 1996).
An immediate goal of the new directors, there-
fore, was to work with National Socialist pris-
oner and survivor groups whose histories had
been underrepresented or misrepresented dur-
ing the GDR (Till, personal interviews with
Gu¨nter Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997).
The emergence of new victim groups compli-
cated this goal. Following unification, human
remains and mass graves were discovered at the
Soviet internment ‘Special Camps’ at Sachsen-
hausen and Buchenwald. Directors had to ad-
dress the concerns of newly formed Soviet
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internment camp survivors and victim groups
who demanded recognition of their suffering
and who received local media attention. Ac-
cording to museum directors, considerable ten-
sion among different victim groups emerged.5
Indeed, at times these groups refused to sit on
the same memorial advisory and consulting
boards because National Socialist survivor and
prisoner groups felt that the internment camp
groups equated their suffering with National
Socialist persecution.
The new directors pursued a ‘decentralized
approach’ to reinterpret the artifacts, historical
research and memorialization of the GDR pe-
riod, and to provide a more extensive represen-
tation of the camp’s history under National
Socialism and for the periods after 1945 (Till,
personal interviews with director Gu¨nter
Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997, 2000). Directors
hoped to emphasize the historical significance
of the camp during National Socialism, but
also to include the post-war histories in new
exhibits. The decentralized approach does two
things: it offers exhibitions about different as-
pects of the camp’s historical layers at particu-
lar sites and designates specific areas for
commemorative and mourning activities by dif-
ferent victim and survivor groups at different
times of the year (Till, personal interviews with
Gu¨nter Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997, 1999,
2000) (also see Morsch 2001). This decentral-
ized approach draws from the grassroots his-
tory workshop and memorial museum
movements that developed in the FRG in the
1980s (Ru¨rup 2003; Till 1996), although new
historical research conducted after unification
has also had an influence. This approach, how-
ever, conflicts with commonly accepted East
German, and to a lesser degree West German,
understandings of concentration camp memori-
als before unification. Memorials in both the
FRG and GDR were generally understood as
places of memory for National Socialist vic-
tims, and in the case of the GDR, for resistance
fighters. In the case of Sachsenhausen this
meant that only the triangular portion of the
concentration camp proper was preserved as a
historical site. When new directors proposed
including the SS training camp, SS officer resi-
dential units and inmate labour camps as part
of the concentration camp memorial complex,
a number of controversies ensued.
First, the proposal to expand the memorial
conflicted with local plans to urbanize some of
the same area. In 1992–3, the City of Oranien-
burg (near the camp site) sought to develop an
area that included the locations of the former
SS troop camp and SS officer residences (Stadt
Oranienburg 1992). The winning design of the
public competition proposed a multi-use com-
plex with residential units, office space, schools
and a sport centre (Berliner Morgenpost 1993;
Der Tagesspiegel 1993; Stadt Oranienburg
1992). Although the proposal encouraged the
integration, rather than isolation, of the his-
toric area and the contemporary city, camp
directors and other West German memory ex-
perts objected, arguing that this was a ‘pro-
fanization’ of an important national historical
site.6 Oranienburg city officials were initially
confused about the intense criticisms and de-
bates, but subsequently rescinded their initial
decision and selected a proposal by Daniel
Libeskind that had been awarded honourable
mention in the competition. Libeskind’s plan,
called ‘Hope Incision’, rejected the premise of
urbanization, and called for a confrontation
with the past through excavations, signs and
landscape designs that mark historic buildings
and significant sites (Forschungsgruppe
Stadt Dorf and Scha¨fer 1994; Libeskind 1993;
Stadt Oranienburg 1993: 63). These historical
sites provide a dialogue with contemporary
land uses such as schools, an international
youth centre, an Institute for Tolerance and an
Institute for Human Rights.
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These debates included more than historians,
urban professionals and artists. Local residents
living in former SS officer neighbourhoods dur-
ing the GDR formed a citizen’s initiative op-
posing preservation status of their homes. They
wanted to prevent what they felt was the
‘Western’ usurpation of their newly acquired
property rights, but also feared that their
neighbourhood would become a neo-Nazi pil-
grimage site (Till, personal interview with citi-
zen initiative organizer, Oranienburg, 1997).7
In negotiating the conflicts between Western
historians and local East German citizens, the
Libeskind architectural group became very im-
portant. Through discussions with the archi-
tects in formal and informal venues (including
local pubs and coffee shops), local residents
finally agreed to place their homes under
‘group’ historical preservation provisions,
which will limit the changes they can make to
those structures, but still allow the Libeskind
project to be realized (Till, personal interview
with Mattias Reese, project co-ordinator,
Daniel Libeskind Buro, Berlin, 1998).
Although West German directors and mem-
orial museum experts, and American–West
German architectural teams played an
influential role in these public debates, the re-
conceptualization of Sachsenhausen resulted
from a complex process of negotiation among
many actors with different personal and politi-
cal interests in the future of this site, including
representatives of various social victim and sur-
vivor groups; memorial advisory boards, edu-
cators, historians, politicians and memorial
museum directors; homeowners’ citizen group
initiatives; historic preservationists; city
officials; city planners; architects; and others.
Debates largely arose in response to memorial
preservation proposals, planning competitions,
media coverage about historical and archaeo-
logical findings, citizen initiatives and other
related contemporary events. Although some
GDR citizens had practical reasons for their
involvement, many attended planning boards
and open meetings, discussed plans with archi-
tects and preservationists, and were active and
influential in victim and survivor groups. In-
deed, one organizer of a homeowner citizen
initiative group now volunteers at Sachsen-
hausen’s main office. By confronting the com-
plex histories and perspectives of Sachsen-
hausen as a historical place, the groups in-
volved found ways to begin working through
post-totalitarian histories as well as German–
German post-war identities.
Place and public memory in Russia
Like Germany, Russia faced an internal debate
about its totalitarian past after the fall of the
communist regime. While repression and hu-
man rights violations had characterized the
Soviet regime throughout its history, this de-
bate cut most deeply in regard to the Stalin era
and the secret police. Under Josef Stalin, who
ruled the Soviet Union from the late 1920s until
his death in 1953, millions of Soviet citizens
were executed, exiled to labour camps, or
otherwise disgraced and traumatized (Conquest
1973; Tucker 1990). Millions more denounced
their fellow citizens out of fear or desire for
advancement. The state security services, then
known as the NKVD and already familiar with
the instruments of repression, carried out this
political persecution.
Although the Communist Party distanced it-
self from much of this legacy during the
Khrushchev-era de-Stalinization campaign
(when, for example, Stalin’s body was removed
from the Lenin Mausoleum), this selective re-
writing of history occurred without significant
public participation. The ‘excesses’ of the
regime were blamed on Stalin as an individual,
even as his bloody efforts to collectivize and
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industrialize Russia were tacitly approved (Co-
hen 1985; Khrushchev 1956). Moreover, the
communist representations of Stalinist history
did not lead to significant change in the secret
police apparatus (by then renamed the KGB),
which merely scaled back its intimidating activ-
ities (Knight 1988). Under Brezhnev the crimes
of the Stalin era were once again swept under
the rug, not to surface again until Mikhail
Gorbachev introduced glasnost in the 1980s
(Tumarkin 1994).
Gorbachev signalled his willingness to ad-
dress the past by releasing physicist and activist
Andrei Sakharov from exile in Gorky, encour-
aging the ‘rehabilitation’ of individuals exiled
or murdered in the Stalin era, and in general
opening up Soviet history to public discussion
and evaluation. Human rights groups emerged
at this time as well. The most important of
these, Memorial, aimed to reveal and acknowl-
edge the dark past by (among other efforts)
erecting a national monument to victims of
political repression (Smith 1996). However, this
movement of memory angered those who
viewed the overall contributions of Stalin and
the secret police in a more positive light (An-
dreeva 1990 [1988]; Ligachev 1993). It is not
coincidental, for example, that the heads of the
KGB and the Ministry of the Interior played
prominent roles in the failed attempt to over-
throw Gorbachev in August 1991 (Daniels
1993). These controversial and painful debates
about the past contributed to the collapse of
the Soviet regime. When the Russian Feder-
ation then emerged as an independent state, for
the first time Russians as a nation had to think
about incorporating and recognizing this aspect
of Soviet history in their public memory.
Unlike in Germany, though, the question in
Russia was not how to recognize and memori-
alize the totalitarian past, but whether it should
be openly acknowledged as a problem at all
(Applebaum 1997; Kramer 2001; Weir 2002). In
Russia, no majority understanding emerged
that saw such public remembering as necessary
for the future health of the state (Suny 1999).
Many Russian political elites had held high
positions in the Soviet party and state appar-
atus, and often this translated into a desire to
downplay or simply ‘move past’ the past. Simi-
larly, much of the population did not see the
past, on balance, as something to be ashamed
of, or believed that energy and resources should
be invested in public displays of repentance.
For example, a survey by the respected agency
VTsIOM found in early 2003 that over half of
Russians polled viewed Stalin’s role in Soviet
history as ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ positive
(VTsIOM Analytic Agency 2003). Indeed, the
New Russian Barometer surveys sponsored by
the Centre for Public Policy at the University of
Strathclyde since 1993 consistently show that
large majorities of Russians rate the pre-per-
estroika political and economic systems much
more highly than the current ones (Rose 2002).
Moreover, unlike Germany, Russia was not
joining a ‘West’ whose political discourse de-
manded a reckoning with the past. As a result,
unlike Germany’s Neue Wache memorial, Rus-
sia as yet has no recognized central national
monument to the victims of political re-
pression.
As in Germany, conflict over memory in
Russia cannot be described as an elite–public
battle. Rather, debate embraces majority elites
and publics who prefer to forget, and minority
elites and publics who fight to remember. In
most cases, however, the process of public
memory cannot be described as one of nego-
tiation and compromise. In the typical pattern,
leading political elites erect and remove monu-
ments with little effective outside input (Forest
and Johnson 2002). If minority elites and public
groups mobilize to oppose these efforts, ma-
jority elites listen but rarely reverse their deci-
sions; only reactions from other politically
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Figure 2 Lubianka Square, Moscow, August 2001. The Solovetskii stone is on the left. The arrow
indicates the former location of Dzerzhinskii’s statue in the centre of the square. Photograph by
B. Forest and J. Johnson.
powerful forces prove effective.8 If the minority
opposition is loud enough, majority elites may
‘mobilize’ broader public opinion in their fa-
vour through commissions, polls and proposed
referenda, using these tools to justify their ac-
tions. In addition, particularly in terms of
elites, ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ can refer not
simply to numbers, but to power resources.
With former security services head Vladimir
Putin as president, for example, Russian elite
groups wishing to reinterpret the past in a more
positive light now have a supporter at the top.
As the case studies of Lubianka Square and the
Park of Arts reveal, the battle over whether and
how to remember the past in Russia remains
sensitive and complex, yet far more circum-
scribed than that in Germany.
Lubianka Square
The changing face of Lubianka Square in
Moscow epitomizes Russia’s conundrums over
recognizing its totalitarian past (Figure 2). This
is a tale of three monuments—one old, one
new and one not yet constructed—and the
imposing headquarters of the state security ser-
vice looming over it all. The first monument, to
Soviet secret police founder Feliks Dzerzhinskii,
stood in the centre of the square until 1991.
Since its removal, different elite groups have
made three efforts to restore it. The activist
organization Memorial installed the second
monument, a small stone from the Solovki
gulag, in a park on the square’s edge in 1990.
The third, a proposed central national monu-
ment to victims of political repression, has
never been erected despite Memorial’s contin-
ued fundraising and lobbying efforts.
For Russians, Dzerzhinskii symbolizes the
order, the terror and the power of the Soviet
regime. In August 1991, after the failed coup
attempt, crowds surrounded the monument
and tried to tear it down. The Moscow city
government, riding the populist wave, acquired
a crane and removed it (Luzhkov 1996). After-
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wards, as disillusionment with the Russian pol-
itical, economic and social situation set in, the
empty circle of grass where Dzerzhinskii’s
monument had stood became a festering sore in
the heart of Moscow. During the 1990s, the
conflict over the restoration of Dzerzhinskii—
and thus, symbolically, the Soviet past—was a
conflict fought principally among elites. In De-
cember 1998, the State Duma (Russia’s lower
legislative house) overwhelmingly passed a res-
olution to restore the statue ‘as a symbol of the
fight against crime’. The Agrarian Party, Com-
munist Party and several smaller parties sup-
ported the resolution, while only Yabloko (the
party of liberal, educated urban intellectuals)
opposed it unanimously (Tolstikhina 1998).
Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov forcefully re-
jected the resolution, but on the grounds that it
violated the principle of local control. The
Agrarians and Communists proposed a similar
resolution in the State Duma in July 2000, but
this time could not muster enough votes to pass
it (Uzelac 2000).
This dynamic changed again in the years
after Putin’s election in 2000, as the president
symbolically and rhetorically re-interpreted the
place of the security services and the Stalinist
past in a more positive light (Forest and John-
son 2002; Kurilla 2002; Traynor 2000). At the
same time, Putin made strong efforts to re-con-
solidate political power in the hands of the
presidency while taming both the Duma and
assertive local leaders like Luzhkov. As a result,
Luzhkov reversed his position on the Dzerzhin-
skii question. When Nikolai Patrushev, head of
the FSB (the KGB’s successor and current occu-
pant of the Lubianka), publicly said in Septem-
ber 2002 that he would like to see Dzerzhinskii
back in his former place of honour, Luzhkov
apparently interpreted it as a hint from Putin
(Abdullaev 2002). Attempting to curry favour
with the powerful president, Luzhkov stated
that Dzerzhinskii’s statue was an ‘excellent
monument’ and that it should be returned to
the square (Filimonova 2002).
While the Communist Party, the FSB and
their supporters cheered Luzhkov’s proposal,
liberal parties and human rights groups
protested (Abdullaev 2002). The Union of
Right Forces party proposed a Duma resolution
condemning the idea, which failed for lack of a
quorum. Liberal political elites joined human
rights groups for a small protest demonstration
on Lubianka Square, and circulated a petition
against the move (Associated Press 2002).
Memorial re-released its 1998 statement against
restoration, but admitted in the new preface
that restoring the statue ‘is supported by
influential forces at the top of Russia’s political
power structure’ (Memorial 2002). Despite the
opposition from minority parties and human
rights groups, a reliable nationwide poll re-
vealed that Russian public opinion favoured
Luzhkov’s proposal, with 56 per cent support-
ing Dzerzhinskii’s restoration, 30 per cent not
expressing an opinion and only 14 per cent
speaking out against it (Public Opinion Foun-
dation 2002).9
Throughout the debate, Putin himself re-
mained silent on the matter. As Sakharov
Foundation director Yurii Samodurov ob-
served, ‘We cannot imagine the German chan-
cellor not protesting if the mayor of Berlin
decided to erect a monument to the head of the
Gestapo. Here, it is possible’ (quoted in Rodin
2002).10 However, an official statement from
the Kremlin did come four days after
Luzhkov’s proposal, when deputy chief of staff
Vladislav Surkov attempted to defuse the ten-
sion by stating that ‘today, some are calling for
the restoration of the Dzerzhinskii statue; to-
morrow others will demand the removal of
Lenin’s body from the mausoleum … both
[ideas] are equally inopportune’ (quoted in
Birch 2002). As a result, in January 2003 the
Moscow City Council finally rejected
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Luzhkov’s proposal to restore the statue, on the
grounds that it would cause unnecessary dis-
cord (O’Flynn 2003). The centre of the square
thus remained empty, its fate (like that of the
monument itself) still unresolved.
Given this significant, near-successful effort
to restore a central symbol of the totalitarian
past, the second monument on Lubianka
Square—the Solovetskii stone—seems ever-
smaller and more incongruous. As its inscrip-
tion states, ‘The society “Memorial” was
especially nominated to provide this stone from
the territory of the Solovetskii camp and to
erect it in memory of the millions of victims of
the totalitarian regime’. Memorial placed this
monument in October 1990 with the express
co-operation of the Gorbachev regime and the
Moscow city government, at a moment when a
few powerful elites preferred to remember the
Soviet past in order to transcend it. For almost
a year, Dzerzhinskii’s statue and the Solovetskii
stone stood across the street from each other,
as duelling symbols of a state tearing itself
apart. After Dzerzhinskii’s removal, its location
served as a rallying point for anti-communist
protestors and victims of the Stalinist regime.
Its presence, however, is also a constant
reminder of the absence of a third monument,
a proposed national monument to the regime’s
victims. Memorial has laboured almost alone
in this seemingly lost cause to construct a
central symbol of memory and atonement. This
lengthy, so-far futile effort to construct a cen-
tral monument contrasts sharply with the rapid
construction of a prominent state-sponsored
monument to those who died at Moscow’s
Dubrovka theatre in October 2002 during a
hostage crisis perpetrated by armed Chechen
separatists. Just one year after the attack, Putin
presided over the well-publicized unveiling of a
large monument commemorating the victims
(Yablokova and Valueva 2003). As Memorial’s
website ruefully observes:
Up until now, even after many discussions and two
design competitions, Memorial has not received a
conclusive answer to the question of whether or not
the monument will be established. Or has the
Solovetskii stone … already become this monu-
ment? … The work of recent years demonstrates
that the perpetuation of memory exceeds the powers
of one social organization. (Memorial 2002)
In short, following Memorial’s placement of
the Solovetskii stone in 1990 and the removal
of Dzerzhinskii’s statue in 1991, the transform-
ation of Lubianka Square arguably represented
the greatest success in recognizing victims of
the Soviet state. Yet even this success was
ambiguous, both because of the resistance (and
apathy) faced by Memorial in its efforts to
construct a central monument to the victims of
Stalinist repression, and because of subsequent
attempts to return Dzerzhinskii to his pedestal.
As the conflicts over Lubianka Square demon-
strate, many Russian elites and publics would
not only prefer to forget the injustices of the
past, but to symbolically restore their perpetra-
tors to a place of honour.
The Park of Arts
On the evening of 22 August 1991, the Moscow
city government used cranes to remove the
statues of Dzerzhinskii and other Soviet leaders
from their pedestals in the centre of Moscow.
These statues ended up in the Park of Arts
(sometimes also referred to as ‘The Park of
Totalitarian Art’). Subsequently, the park came
to play an unusual role in the re-conceptualiza-
tion of public memory. Not only did local
political elites engage in a concerted effort to
de-politicize the statues, but Yurii Luzhkov
also approved the erection of an immense and
reviled statue to Peter the Great on the river-
bank by the park’s edge. Local elites carried
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out both the de-politicization of the Soviet
statues and the construction of Peter the Great
with little public input (Forest and Johnson
2002). Yet several public groups actively (and
futilely) protested against the statue of Peter
the Great, while the de-politicization strategy
met resistance only from Dzerzhinskii’s sup-
porters.
At first, the Soviet statues sat forlorn and
unmarked in a weedy corner of the park. But in
1996, the Moscow city government formalized
the display by restoring the statues, installing
small plaques identifying the figures, and nam-
ing the area the Park of Arts. The new park
was placed under the jurisdiction of Muzeon, a
subsidiary of Moscow’s Committee on Culture,
and became a display area for contemporary
artistic works. By the summer of 1999, former
Soviet leaders shared the park with a rose
garden, abstract religious art and numerous
busts.
The most important Soviet-era statues had
plaques describing the subject, artist, material
used and where the piece had been displayed.
After this description, the plaques attached to
the statues ended with a depoliticizing dis-
claimer: ‘It has historical and artistic value.
The monument is in the memorializing style of
political-ideological designs of the Soviet pe-
riod. Protected by the state’. Characterizing
these statues in historical and artistic terms
intended to drain them of contemporary politi-
cal significance by politically decontextualizing
the works and emphasizing their alleged artistic
value. Indeed, the pieces were placed haphaz-
ardly and the descriptions never referred to
more than a single statue.
Only the display surrounding Stalin’s statue
had obvious political symbolism, and it is
clearly an unusual case. Unlike the other, re-
cently removed Soviet-era statues, the Stalin
statue was a casualty of the de-Stalinization
process under Khrushchev, and had reportedly
been buried in the sculptor’s garden until it was
‘resuscitated’ and placed in the park in 1991
(Boym 2001). Ironically, the Stalin statue thus
reappeared at the same moment that his leader-
ship was most severely called into question.
Then, at the height of Luzhkov’s anti-commu-
nist sentiments in 1998, the amateur artist Ev-
genii Chubarov donated a sculpture group
symbolizing the gulag to the park, which
promptly erected it behind Stalin’s statue. Both
a de-politicizing description and the stone rep-
resentations of the gulag stood together with
the statue, epitomizing the tension over the
Stalinist past.
Luzhkov’s decision to erect a huge, 60-metre-
high statue of Peter the Great nearby more
accurately indicated how many political elites
preferred to remember the past—by skipping
over the Soviet period entirely and glorifying
Russia’s Tsarist period (Figure 3). Although the
city ostensibly held a public competition to
design the monument, Luzhkov’s favourite
sculptor Zurab Tsereteli got the commission
(Smith 2002). After the statue took up its dom-
inating position on the Moscow skyline in
1997, two public groups spoke out against it.
One group, a coalition of artists led by gallery
owner Marat Gel’man, pressed for a public
referendum on removing the statue. Luzhkov
promised to create a commission to study the
matter, but this proved to be merely a stalling
tactic. As Smith (2002) notes, Tsereteli’s sup-
porters in the political and art worlds then
carried out a massive campaign in the press to
defend the sculpture and to publicize the re-
ported $12 million cost of dismantling it. The
mayor’s efforts to mobilize ‘public opinion’
paid off, with surveys revealing that only 12 per
cent of Muscovites wanted to hold the ‘costly’
referendum, and, although many had reserva-
tions about the monument’s aesthetic merits, a
full 86 per cent spoke against dismantling it
(Itar-Tass 1997). Armed with this data, the
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Figure 3 Peter the Great statue, Moscow, July
1999. The Park of Arts lies in the foreground.
Photograph by B. Forest and J. Johnson.
body from his mausoleum on Red Square. Al-
though the group did not actually detonate the
explosives, they declared the monument ‘sym-
bolically destroyed’ (Kamakin 1997).
Thus, the transformation of the Park of Arts
demonstrates how leading Russian politicians
have often chosen to avoid confrontations with
the totalitarian past. De-politicizing Soviet stat-
ues and icons through their placement in the
park represented an attempt to circumvent the
kind of vigorous, participatory debates charac-
teristic of German public memory. The statues
of Soviet leaders in the Park of Arts remained
in their new places, silent witnesses to a past
that many Russian elites and publics preferred
not to remember. In addition, Luzhkov’s de-
cision to construct the widely detested Peter the
Great statue illustrates how organized public
groups have often been marginalized in the
memorialization process. Although the statue
faced challenges from public groups with very
different compositions, ideologies and motiva-
tions, Luzhkov and his city government used
their influence to marshal the support of
broader ‘public opinion’ and justify the statue’s
presence. The statue remained despite its un-
popularity, exemplified by an aborted attempt
to blow it up—a far cry from the ‘normal’
process of negotiation in Germany.
‘Public’ cultures of memory
As Staeheli (1996) suggests, many scholars tend
to assume that a ‘public place’ like a memorial
can be equated with the ‘public sphere’. Yet to
do so fetishizes places of memory as objects
rather than ongoing sets of processes through
which understandings of political community
and social identity are negotiated. Further, by
mistaking the physical existence of ‘public
places’ as evidence of a public sphere, scholars
do not pay enough attention to the ways that
mayor’s commission decided to leave the statue
in place.
Not long after this decision, another group
‘spoke out’, but in a very different way. In July
1997, the obscure ‘RSFSR Revolutionary Mili-
tary Council’ placed plastic explosives around
the monument and threatened to blow it up in
protest of Luzhkov’s threats to remove Lenin’s
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place-making processes produce publics. The
three case studies presented here indicate how
public memory is a process, rather than ma-
terial object or outcome. The comparison of
German and Russian public memory since 1989
highlights the distinct ways in which multiple
elites and publics typically engage in the memo-
rialization process, illustrating why studies of
public memory should move beyond the simple
dichotomy between ‘elite’ and ‘public’.
These examples also demonstrate the com-
plex ways various ‘publics’ re-narrate national
history(s) through place-making. Groups may
have different agendas and conceptions that
sometimes lead to elite–public conflicts, but
that may also engender elite–elite and public–
public conflicts. The category of ‘counter-mem-
ory’ as ‘resistance’ is too simplistic: a range of
actors and groups may act in ways not necess-
arily structured by opposition to state or elite
domination. Furthermore, civic organizations
and interest groups may have highly differenti-
ated access to public forums that affect their
power and influence in the process of public
memory.
Discussions and events about Sachsenhausen,
for example, took place in a range of venues,
including the local and national media, artistic
practices, public competitions and protests.
While these discussions were at times quite
contentious, overall the process resulted in
negotiation and the incorporation of different
perspectives. Participants see the current pro-
posal for Sachsenhausen’s future development
as a compromise solution that incorporates
different layers of history, contemporary social
views and Western humanitarian (or universal-
ist) hopes for the future.
Moreover, given the complex histories and
post-unification debates about Sachsenhausen,
some Western museum memorial directors now
argue that different claims to ‘victim’ status
and social responsibility for past crimes should
be evaluated by comparing different total-
itarian periods within German history at
particular historic sites. These same directors
may not have supported such a process in the
former West Germany in the 1980s because
they may have interpreted the Kohl admini-
stration’s cultural politics as an attempt to blur
the categories of National Socialist victim and
perpetrator (see Habermas 1989; Maier 1988;
Till 1996). Sachsenhausen shows how GDR
and even FRG approaches to representing
and remembering totalitarian pasts can be
reconceptualized.
In the new Germany, emerging practices of
public memory may conflict with existing nar-
ratives, political cultures and social hierarchies
that limit the participation and influence of
some groups—notably former East German cit-
izens—but there is still a sense that the ‘nor-
mal’ or proper process of memorialization
involves vigorous public debates and nego-
tiation rather than simple top-down, elite-
driven decision-making. Civic organizations
play a central role in these discussions and
processes, and a broad array of publics success-
fully engaged ‘official’ memorial and planning
proposals to produce new conceptions of Ger-
man identity through a confrontation with the
past.
In contrast, Russian civic organizations have
been both less interested and less influential in
publicly confronting the more troublesome as-
pects of the Soviet past. The relative lack of
interest—with the notable exception of Mem-
orial—reflects a broadly shared opinion that
such ‘reckoning with’ or ‘atoning for’ the So-
viet past is unnecessary for contemporary Rus-
sians and would devalue the more positive
aspects of Soviet history. This indifference does
not carry over into other realms of public
memory, however. Peter the Great’s immense
and aesthetically questionable statue provoked
intense outcry, both organized and diffuse.
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Similarly, civic and elite groups have co-oper-
ated to erect or restore many cultural and
religious monuments across Russia.
More importantly, though, elites in local,
provincial and federal governments have cap-
tured the memorialization process for those
public sites with potential political resonance.
This is not to say that powerful Russian politi-
cians ignore popular opinion; indeed, they are
attentive to the national ‘visions’ that public
monuments convey, and manipulate such mon-
uments in order to associate themselves with
attractive symbols and to bolster their legiti-
macy. Rather, as the case studies illustrate,
their control over the process contributes to
circumscribing debate over and recognition of
the more controversial aspects of Soviet his-
tory.
This comparative perspective in discussions
of public memory highlights the shifting nature
of inclusions and exclusions of various publics
and sub-publics. Conflicts over memorializa-
tion in Germany since 1989 show how even a
relatively open and participatory culture of
public memory still privileges experts in ways
that can exclude or diminish other perspectives.
Russia demonstrates, however, that such ex-
clusion is relative: post-totalitarian societies
may develop a top-down rather than a more
participatory culture of public memory, ulti-
mately placing greater constraints on the ways
in which a nation can imagine a new identity
for itself.
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Notes
1 We use the term public memory to emphasize the
complex interactions and tensions within and between
elite and other social groups. The term public implies
political engagement and discussion, whereas cultural
memory need not be political (Sturken 1997).
2 See the voluminous literature about working through
the past in Germany (Assmann and Frevert 1999;
Jaspers 1961; Kittel 1993; Reichel 1995).
3 On hauntings, ghosts, memory and place, see Bell
(1997), Gordon (1997), Pile (2002) and Till (forth-
coming).
4 Information for this section comes from numerous
personal interviews, newspaper articles and participant-
observations collected and conducted by Till from 1995
to 2001. On the history of Sachsenhausen, see Endlich
(1992), Morsch (1996), Till (forthcoming) and Wiedmer
(1999).
5 Forty-one national associations exist for the pre-1945
prisoner groups; 17 are the most important numerically
and have national Sachsenhausen committees. In Ger-
many, three Sachsenhausen committees exist (West
Berlin, East Germany and West Germany); other na-
tional associations include the Central Council of Ger-
man Jews, the Central Council of Sinti and Roma, four
homosexual organizations and the Social Democratic
Working Group. The foreign groups, according to
Morsch, are unified and have national groups with
subgroups. The prisoner advisory board consists of
representatives from up to twenty groups, including
post-1945 groups (Till, personal interviews with Gu¨nter
Morsch, Oranienburg, 1997).
6 Similar debates emerged for development proposals at
Ravensbru¨ck and Auschwitz (see Charlesworth 1994;
Dwork and van Pelt 1996).
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7 Oranienburg gained a reputation for radical right ac-
tivity after unification, and visitors to the camp were
harassed by neo-Nazis, visitor books had anti-Semitic
entries and the camp suffered physical defacements,
including an arson attack on the so-called Jewish bar-
racks in 1992 (Oranienburger Generalanzeiger 1995).
8 One recent exception to this trend was Moscow mayor
Yurii Luzhkov’s decision to abandon plans to build
numerous monuments representing characters from
Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel Master and Margarita in the
wealthy Patriarch’s Pond area. The outcry among local
residents was so great that Luzhkov scaled back the
project considerably, agreeing to erect only a simple
monument to Bulgakov himself (Balmforth 2003).
9 Support in Moscow itself was more mixed, with a
VTsIOM poll showing 44 per cent in favour and 38 per
cent opposed (Saradzhyan 2002).
10 Ironically, there is a memorial space at the former
Gestapo Headquarters in central Berlin, called the Top-
ography of Terror International Documentation Cen-
tre. In contrast, however, this space functions as an
‘open wound’ of the city and nation, rather than as a
monument to Nazi officers and leaders (Till forth-
coming).
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Abstract translations
L’identite´ nationale post-totalitaire: le sou-
venir public en Allemagne et en Russie
Par une analyse comparative de l’Allemagne et
de la Russie, cet article explore comment la
participation dans le processus de comme´mor-
ation peut intervenir et trouver son expression
dans la constitution d’une identite´ nationale de
socie´te´s post-totalitaires. Compte tenu que
leurs identite´s nationales e´taient lie´es de pre`s a`
des re´gimes tyranniques, les socie´te´s post-total-
itaires se confrontent aujourd’hui au proble`me
familier de se re-pre´senter un portrait national
civique et de´mocratique. Nous mettons en com-
paraison trois lieux de comme´moration: le
monument comme´moratif du camp de concen-
tration de Sachsenhausen en Allemagne, et le
Carre´ Lubianka et le Parc des Arts en Russie.
Nous soutenons que meˆme si le pouvoir de
l’E´tat a e´te´ re´duit de manie`re dramatique et que
la socie´te´ civile a e´merge´, un mode`le dichoto-
mique simple opposant l’e´lite au public ne per-
met pas de comprendre la nature de la
participation dans le processus de la reconstitu-
tion du souvenir. Plutoˆt, des interactions
mutuelles entre une multitude de publics et
d’e´lites, se distinguant a` travers divers contex-
tes par type et par intensite´, se combinent en un
pastiche complexe du souvenir public qui per-
met a` la fois d’interpre´ter le passe´ d’une nation
et de pre´coniser des mode`les se´duisants axe´s
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RDA illustre comment les de´bats passablement
ouverts peuvent exclure certaines repre´senta-
tions de la nation. Ne´anmoins, des de´bats pub-
lics assez vigoureux ont e´te´ tenus en Allemagne
sur la comme´moration des e´poques totalitaires
qui l’ont marque´e. Le cas de la Russie fait
contraste. Les groupes d’e´lites ont le plus sou-
vent neutralise´ ou embrouille´ la participation
au processus de comme´moration. Ils sont peu
dispose´s a` reconnaıˆtre le passe´ totalitaire du
pays et re´pugne a` l’identite´ nationale en e´merg-
ence qui est moins civique et de´mocratique
qu’en Allemagne.
Mots-clefs: Allemagne, monuments comme´mo-
ratifs, souvenir public, Russie.
Identidad nacional en las sociedades posto-
talitarias: la memoria pu´blica en Alemania
y Rusia
Por un ana´lisis comaprativo de Alemania y
Rusia este papel explora co´mo participacio´n en
el proceso de memorializar afecta y refleja la
formacio´n de identidad nacional en las so-
ciedades postotalitarias. Estas sociedades pos-
totalitarias se enfrentan al problema comu´n de
co´mo re-presentar su cara´cter nacional como
cı´vico y democra´tico, pues sus identidades na-
cionales han estado estrechamente ligadas con
re´gimenes opresivas. Por un estudio compara-
tivo de tres sitios de memoriales—el memorial
del campo de concentracio´n de Sachsenhausen
en Alemania, la Plaza Lubianka y el Parque de
Artes en Rusia, sugerimos que au´n cuando se
reduce drama´ticamente el poder del estado y se
abre la sociedad civil—un simple dicotomı´a
elite-pu´blico no capta adecuadamente la natu-
raleza de participacio´n en el proceso de re-for-
macio´n de la memoria. Ma´s bien, interacciones
mutuas entre mu´ltiples elites y pu´blicos, de
varios tipos e intensidades a trave´s de contex-
tos, se combinan a formar un pastiche com-
plejo de memoria pu´blica que tanto interpreta
el pasado de una nacio´n como sugiere modelos
deseables para su futuro. La dominacio´n de un
estilo occidental de memorializar en el antiguo
Alemania Oriental demuestra como hasta los
debates relativamente abiertos pueden excluir a
ciertas representaciones de la nacio´n. No ob-
stante, en Alemania han habido debates pu´bli-
cos comparativamente ene´rgicos sobre co´mo
memorializar sus perı´odos totalitarios. Por con-
traste, grupos e´lites rusos han burlado o manip-
ulado participacio´n en el proceso de
memorializar, lo cual refleja tanto una reticen-
cia a tratar su pasado totalitario como una
identidad nacional emergente menos cı´vica y
menos democra´tica que la de Alemania.
Palabras claves: Alemania, monumentos y
memorials, la polı´tica de memoria, memoria
pu´blica, Rusia.
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